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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
CARL T. EVANS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
VS. 
PICKETT BROS FARMS, a 
Partnership and JESS W. PICKETT, 
Otherwise known as J. W. Pickett, 
Def end ants and Appellants. 
RE1SPONDENT"S BRIEF 
Case No. 12616 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff filed this suit to recover a principal balance 
of $1065.00, plus interest on that amount from its due 
date until the date of judgment at the rate of 6% per 
annum, plus plaintiff's costs, claimed to be owed by 
the defendants to the plaintiff. Plaintiff contends 
that his claim is founded upon an instrument or instru-
ments in writing, and at the trial Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 
2, and 3 were offered and received in evidence, one or 
more of which, along with other proven facts, meets 
the requirements of Section 78-12-23 U.C.A 1953, Utah's 
six-year Statute of Limitations, as being founded upon 
an instrument or instruments in writing. Defendants 
contend that plaintiff's claim is barred by the provi-
1 
sions of Section 78-12-25 U.C.A. 1953, the four-year Stat. 
u.te of Limitations, and section 78-12-23 U.C.A. 1953, the 
six-year Statute of Limitations. Plaintiff contends that 
hi-s claim is not barred by the four-year Statute of Lim. 
itations because such Statute is not applicable to plain· 
tiff's claim, and that his claim is not barred by the six· 
year Statute of Limitations for the reason that this Stat· 
ute had not run when plaintiff's Complain was filed on 
October 11, 1967. 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court, Hon. J. Harlan Burns, found and 
held that plaintiff's claim is not barred by the four-year 
Statute of Limitations pleaded, and that plaintiff's claim 
is founded upon an instrument or instruments in writ· 
ing, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 and Plain· 
tiff's Exhibit 3, thereby bringing the plaintiff's claim 
within Utah's six-year Statute of Limitations, Section 
78-12-23 U.C.A 1953, and that by virtue thereof and oth· 
er facts found in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendants, including payments made by the defend· 
ants to the plaintiff which started the Statute of Limi· 
tations to running over again, and the period of time 
that both partners of the partnership of Pickett Bros. 
Farms were out of the State of Utah which tolled the 
running of the Statute, and that the six-year period of 
limitations had not run when plaintiff's Complaint was 
filed, and that plaintiff's claim is not barred by the six· 
year Statute of Limitations pleaded by the defe~da~tl, 
and that the defendants owed the plaintiff a prmc1pal 
balance of $1065.00, which amount the Court found had 
been due and owing from the defendants to the plaint· 
iff since September 22, 1961, together with interest 
thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from September 22 
1961, to the date of judgment, and for plaintiff's costs. 
and entered judgment accordingly. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants and appellants desire that the decision 
of the luwer Court be reversed on the ground that plain-
tiff's claim is not founded upon an instrument or in-
struments in writing, but upon an oral agreement and 
that plaintiff's claim is barred by the Statutes of Limi-
tation pleaded by defendants. Plaintiff seeks to have 
the decision of the lower Court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about October 18, 1959, the defendant, Jess 
W. Pickett, contacted the plaintiff, Carl T. Evans, about 
doing land leveling of 40 acres of land in Parowan Val-
ley for Pickett Bros. Farms, a partnership. The plaint-
iff told said defendant he could do such land leveling, 
and when plaintiff was asked what his charges would 
be plaintiff told Jess W. Pickett that $10.00 an hour is 
what plaintiff charged for his equipment and for him-
self in such land leveling, and the defendant, Jess W. 
Pickett, told the plaintiff that that was a satisfactory 
price for such services. Transcript page 4,, lines 2 to 19, 
Incl. The defendant Jess W. Pickett told the plaintiff 
that he had applied to the Agricultural Stabilization and 
Conservation Service, ASC, for assistance in sharing a 
part of the cost of such land leveling, and for the neces-
sary engineering work that had to be done in connec-
tion with the project. Transcript page 4, lines 13 to 16, 
Incl. and lines 22 to 24, Incl. 
After the engineering for the project had been done 
plaintiff was instructed by the defendant, J. W. Pickett, 
to proceed with the work. Plaintiff proceeded with the 
land leveling, using a crawler tractor weighing approx-
imately 12 tons, and a carry-all weighing about 3 tons. 
Transcript page 6, lines 7 to 13, Incl. As stated in Ap-
pellants' Brief, page 3, the land leveling was done in 
October and November, 1959, and was completed No-
3 
vember 29, 1959. Plaintiff kept track of the hours he 
spent using said equipment in doing this land leveling 
and put in 246% hours on the project. Transcript page 
7, lines 17 to 22, Incl. 
After the land leveling had been completed and 
Gordon C. Kirtley, Project Engineer, had approved the 
work, and on December 11, 1959, the plaintiff went to 
the ASC offices in Cedar City to help fill out papers re-
lating to this land leveling transaction. It was there 
that Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 was filled out in triplicate 
Those portions of the instrument that are typed in were 
typed in by ASC secretary, and the plaintiff filled in, 
in his handwriting, all parts of the instrument which 
are in handwriting, except the signatures and the dates 
accompanying each signature. Alma C. Lawrence sign· 
ed the instrument for the government agency and wrote 
the date of signing 12-11-59, to the right of his signa· 
ture. The farmer, Pickett Bros. Farms, a partnership, 
was required to sign this document after it was filled 
out, and as Jess W. Pickett had left Iron County and 
gone to California the secretary at the ASC office ad· 
dresed an envelope to Jess W. Pickett at his California 
address, and the instrument so filled in was mailed to 
Jess W. Pickett for his signature. Thereafter the instru· 
ment duly signed in triplicate "Pickett Bros. Farms by 
J. W. Pickett, Mgr." followed by the date 12-14-59 was 
returned to the ASC office in Cedar City, and thereupon 
the pink copy was sent to the farmer, Pickett Bros. 
Farms, the blue one, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, was furnisred 
to the plaintiff, vendor, and the ASC retained the white 
one. 
The ASC paid the $1,000.00 it had agreed to pay on 
the land leveling. Only two payments were made by the 
defendants to the plaintiff, namely, one payment of $100. 
00 evidenced by the Defendant's Exhibit 1 - check date~ 
April 25, 1960, and the other a payment of $300.00 evi· 
denced by Defendants' Exhibit 2 - check dated Sep· 
4 
tember 3, 1961, for that amount. Jess W. Pickett did 
mail to the plaintiff a check, Plaintiff's exhibit 2, Pay-
able to plaintiff for $700.00, from California where he 
then \Vas, which had written on the back of it "Pay-
ment in Full for land leveling in 1959." This check was 
never cashed as plaintiff would not accept the amount 
thereoff in full settlement, and plaintiff told defendant, 
Jess W. Pickett, that there was an additional $365.00 
over and above the amonnt of said check due plaintiff. 
Transcript page 12, line 30, page 13, lines 1 to 30, Incl. 
page 14, lines 1to17, Incl. 
The defendant Pickett Bros. Farms, a partnership, 
<.:onsisting of Jess W. Pickett, otherwise known as J. W. 
Pickett, and his brother, M. G. Pickett. Transcript page 
39, lines 7 to 11, Incl. M. G. Pickett has resided in 
California and has spent no substantial amount of 
time in Utah since December, 1959. Transcr~pt page 
39, lines 7 to 11, Incl., and lines 26 to 30, Incl. and page 
40, line 1. The other partner Jess W. Pickett, otherwise 
know as J. \V. Pickett, was out of the State of Utah and 
in the State of California from January 2, 1962, to the 
last of April, 1962. The check, Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, dat-
ed Jan. 2, 1962, was mailed by said defendant to the 
plaintiff from California and received by the plaintiff 
on or about that date, and the said defendant did not 
come back to Utah until the last part of April in 1962, 
at which time the plaintiff first talked to said defend-
ant, Jess \V. Pickett, about the check and told him in 
substance that the check did not constitute full pay-
ment for the land leveling - that it lacked $365.00 of 
being the amount that was due the plaintiff for the 
land leveling. Transcript page 12, line 30, page 13, lines 
l to 30, Incl., and page 14, lines 1 to 17. Incl. The plain-
tiff contacted the defendant, Jess W. Pickett, numerous 
times requesting payment of the full balance due for 
such land leveling, and finally said defendant told the 
plaintiff he was not intending to pay it. Transcript page 
14, lines 18 to 30, Incl,. and page 15, lines 1 to 30, Incl., 
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and page 16, lines 1 to 16, Incl. And plaintiff thereafter 
and on October 11, 1967, filed this suit. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: The plaintiff-respondent's claim is found. 
ed upon an instrument or instruments in writing, and 
hence Utah's six-year Statute of Limitations, Section 
78-12-23 U.C.A. 1953 applies. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and Plaintiff"s Exhibit 2 wet€ 
signed Pickett Bros. Farms, by J. W. Pickett, Mgr. for 
and in behalf of said partnership, consisting of himsell 
and his brother M. G. Pickett. These exhibits constitutr 
admissions and statements of facts by the defendants ol 
the essential facts relating to the land leveling transac· 
tion between the plaintiff-respondent and the defend· 
ants-appellants, from which the law will imply a,1 ob· 
ligation on the part of the obligors to pay, and hence 
bring the case within the six-year Statute, 78-12-23 U.CA 
1953. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Section 11, designatrs what 
was furnished to the Farmer, Picket Bros. Farms, Land 
Leveling of 40 acres of land at a price of $10.00 per 
hour, for a total maximum cost of $2465.00, with a max· 
imum payment by the government of $1,000.00, and this 
Exhibit further provides "SC'ction 111 the materials or 
services described in Section 11, columnc; (a) and (cl 
were received by me and will be or have been used in 
carrying out the approved practices under the Agr!<:ul· 
tural Conservation Program for which they were fur· 
nished. I certify that the price paid to the vendor does 
not exceed the difference between the fair price, if ap· 
plicable, and the payment by the Government." 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, the Land Leveling Plan pre· 
pared by Gordon C. Kirtley, Engineer for Soil Conserva· 
tion Service, and which was signed and approved b) 
Pkkett Bros. Farms, by J. W. Pickett, Mgr., while prob· 
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ably not by itself constituting a complete instrument·in 
writing upon which the action could be founded, does 
set forth more in detail the land leveling which the 
plaintiff was to do and did do for the defendants, and 
constitutes a written approval by the defendants of the 
contents of said instrument, and if more details per-
taining to the land leveling to be done and which was 
done by the plaintiff for the defendants are required 
than were set forth and agreed to by the defendants in 
plaintiff's Exhibit 1, this Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 suppli~s 
them. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, the check for $700.00 written 
to the plaintiff and signed by Pickett Bros. Farms, by 
J. W. Pickett, dated January 2, 1962, and mailed by the 
defendant J. W. Pickett to the plaintiff on or about the 
day it bears date, constitutes a written acknowledgment 
that the defendants owed the plaintiff at least the amount 
of this check for the land leveling done by the plaintiff 
for the defendants 
The following authorities are submitted in support 
of plaintiff's contention that plaintiff's action is found-
ed upon an instrument or instruments in writing with.: 
in subdivision (2) of Section 78-12-23, U.C.A. 1953, the 
six year statute: 
Statutory provision: 78-12-23 U.C.A 1953. Within si?C 
years - (2) An action upon any contract, obligation or 
liability founded upon an instrument in writing, except 
those mentioned in the preceding section. 
BRACKLEIN v. REALTY INS. CO. at al, - 80 P. (2nd) 
471, 95 Utah 490. 
11. The statutes of limitations on liabilitf.es "found-
ed upon an instrument in writing" and "not found¢ 
upon an instrument in writing" means the same as though 
the word "founded" were omitted, and action is "found-
ed upon an instrument in writing" if liability grows out 
?f written instruments, not remotely or ultimately, but 
immediately; if it arises or is assumed or imposed from 
from the instrument itself, or its recitals; if the instru-
ment aC'knowledges or states a fact from which law im-
7. 
plies obligation to pay or contains the contract 0 . . r pro. 
m1se to pay or to do the thmg for which action is brought 
Rev. St. 1933, 104-2-22; 104-2-23, as amended by law~ 
1935, c. 113. 
13 .. A. caus~ of action for foreclosure of mortgage 
and ~ef1c1ency Judgment against grantee of mortgagea 
premises who assumed the mortgage by class in the deed 
was "found~d .on ~nstruments in writing" within six-year 
statute of hm1tat10ns, though grantee did not sign note 
mortgage or deed. Rev. St. 1933, 104-2-22, 104-2-23, a; 
amended by Laws 1935, c. 113. 
14. A Grantee's acceptance of a deed containinz 
mortgage assumption clause makes the obligations creat'. 
ed by deed a written contract, not subject to limitatiom 
governing oral contracts. Rev. St. 1933, 104-2-22; 104·2· 
23 as amended by Laws 1935, c. 113. 
O'BRIEN v. KING, 164 Pac., 631, 174 Cal. 769. 
1. A cause of action is "founded on an instrument in 
writing," within Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 337, subd. 1, limit· 
ing such actions to four years, when the contract, obliga· 
tion, or liabilility grows out of written instruments, nol 
remotely, but immediately. 
2. An instrument reading "Received from (plaintiff) 
• • • $450 in U. S. gold coin, at 5 per cent interest" sign· 
ed by defendant, is an instrument in writing, barred only 
after four years, under Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 337, subd. l. 
TAGUS RANCH CO. v. HUGHES, 148 P. '..:::d, 79, 64 CA. 
128. 
1. A cause of action is "founded on an instrument 
in writing," within statute limiting such actions to four 
years, where the contract, obligation or liabilit~ grows 
out of written instruments, not remotely or uJt1mately. 
but immediately. Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 337, subd. 1. 
2. In order to come within statute limiting act!o~s 
founded on instruments in \\Ti ting to four years,~ 
sufficient if writing upon which action is based acknow· 
ledges the debt and sets forfli--asfafo- of facts frorr1~ 
obligation of Iiability-to--E~Y-~~~c~ssarH_i~an~-~ 
flows, and writing need not conta_i_n ~n exIJress pr~ 
to pay. Code Civ. Proc-:-sec. 337, subd. 1. (underJming 
ours). 
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3. An instrument reading "I, • • • hereby confess 
and acknowledge that I have stolen and embezzled from 
you the sum of Nineteen Hundred Sixty-Three and 
801100 ($1963.80) ", signed by defendant, was an "in-
strument in writing" so that cause of action thereon 
was barred only after four years. Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 
337, subd. l. 
TANZOLA v. DE RITA, 277 P. 2d, 515, California, 1955. 
6. Loans in form of two checks, with word "loan" 
written thereon constituted agreement evidenced by 
writing, so that four-year, not two-year, statute of lim-
itations applied to action against executor of husband's 
will on such checks after his death. Code Civ. Proc. Secs. 
337, 339. 
t. To come within four-year statute of limitations 
applicable to action for debt evidenced by or founded on 
written contract, writing need not contain express prom-
ise to pay debt, but is sufficient, if it acknowledges debt 
and states facts from which obligation or liability to pay 
debt necessarily and directly flows. Code Civ .. Proc. Sec. 
337. (underlining ours.) 
The fact that oral negotiations took place and an 
oral agreement was reached, concerning which in our 
case there was some dispute, does not preclude the claim 
from being founded upon an instrument or instruments 
in writing if later a writing were signed by the party to 
be charged thereby, in which he agrees to facts from 
which the law will imply an obligation to pay the amount 
designated. 
See the case of JOSEPH TANZOLA v. JOHN DE RITA, 
EXECUTOR, 285 P. 2d, 897, 88 Cal. 2d 1. 
3. Action against executor for recovery of money al-
legedly loaned to testator by plaintiff, evidenced by two 
checks with the word "loan" written upon their faces 
and endorsed by testator's wife, who had full authority 
to make such endorsement on his behalf, was not an ac 
tion founded on an oral agreement and was governed ~y 
four-year limitations' statute. West's Ann. Code Civ. 
Proc. Secs. 337, 339, subd. 1. 
9 
Language of the court, page 901. .._ ___ _ _ 
The facts that plaintiff in his original comp-1-~i;~t- ~li . 
ed that he and decedent "entered into an oral agr~ 
ment whereby " plaintiff agreed to loan $12,000 to d~ 
c.edent .and that pursuant to such oral agreement plain· 
tiff debvered the two S6,000.00 checks to decedent d 
not establish this action as one upon an oral rather t;:' 
written obligation ..... " n 
The following cases cited by opposing counsel in 
appelants' brief as authority for holding plaintiff's clairr, 
is not founded upon an instrument in writing, are not 
in point in this case for the following reasons: 
The case of Whitehall -vs- Lowe, 37 P. 589, 10 Uta~ 
419, simply held that the two verbal agreements upon 
which the plaintiff based his ciairi.1 were so vague ana 
uncertain that neither could be enforced. No contention 
was made that either of the claims sued upon were 
founded upon an instrument in writing. 
In the case of Woolf -vs- Grny - 158 P. 788, 48 Utan 
239, the plaintiff's Complaint set forth two causes of ac· 
tion, the first on an open account and the second on an 
account stated. The court held that both claims were 
barred by the respective Statutes of Limitation appfo 
able to each. No contention was made that either claim 
was founded upon an instrument in writing. 
In the case of O'Donnell -vs- Parker - 160 P. 1192 
48 Utah 578, the question was not whether the plaintiffs 
claim was based on an open account or was founded upon 
an instrument in writing, but the question to be decid~ 
was whether the defendant by scheduling the account 
sued upon in his petition in bankniptcy <1.f1er it was out· 
lawed, constituted a written ackno\vledgment of the.ex· 
istence of the debt undc1· a stalc1te of the same wording 
as our present Section 78-1:2-44 U.C.A. 1953. The court 
held that it was not. 
As stated by opposing counsc 1 the six-year statu~e 
• r J Fuel & Grain 
was not involved m the case 01 cremy 7P 
Company -vs- Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Co. · 20 · 
10 
155; 60 Utah 153. 
In the case of Last Chance Ranch Co. -vs- Erickson -
25 P. 2d 952; 82 Utah 475, plaintiff's claim was based sole-
ly upon an oral agreement to transfer stock and the same 
oral agreement rieterated one year and three months 
later. The court held that the four-year statute started 
to run on the first date the plaintiff could have sued on 
the first oral agreement, and as four years had run from 
that date before the commencement of the action the 
claim was barred. 
In the case of Petty and Riddle, Inc., -vs- Lunt - 138 
P. 2d 648; 104 Utah 130, the plaintiff Petty and Riddle 
Inc., a corporation, sued Wilson N. Lunt, an exstock-
holder for one-half of the moneys the corporation had 
to pay the State of Utah and to the United States Gov-
ernment after the assets of the corporation had been 
divided between Charles B. Petty and Wilson N. Lunt, 
the two principal stoskholders of the corporation, pur-
suant to a written agreement between them idividually. 
The plaintiff corporation contended that its claims were 
based on the written agreement between the said two 
principal stockholders , and that the lim~tation for 
bringing the action was controlled by the six-year sta-
tute. The Supreme Court held that there was nothing 
in the written agreement between the two stockholders 
that gave the plaintiff corporation any claim for the re-
lief prayed for, and that the claims of the plaintiff cor-
poration, if any existed, were founded upon implied con-
tract, and that action on such claims was barred for the 
reason that the four-year statute had run before the ac-
tion was filed. 
POINT 2: The six-year Statute of Limitations had 
not run when this action was commenced. 
Part payments on this contractual obligation were 
made by the defendants to the plaintiff as follows: 
$100.00 on April 25, 1960, and $300.00 on September 3, 
11 
1961, and these payments started the six-year Stat 
f L" . · u~ o im1tat1~ns running over again on the respectiw 
dates on which they were made. In support of this con. 
tention the plaintiff submits the following: 
78-12-44 U.C.A. 1953. 
"78-12-44. Payment -- Acknowledgment -- PromL11 
to pay extends period. In any case founded on contract 
when any part of the principal or interest shall haw 
been paid, or an ackno\vledgment of an exisling liabilih 
debt or claim, or any promise to pay the same, shall ha~f 
been made, an action may be brnugi1t within the perion 
prescribed for the same after such payment, acknowledi· 
ment or promise; but such acknowlegment or promlle 
must be in writing, signed by foe party to be chargea 
thereby. When a right of action is barred by the provi· 
sions of any statute, it sllall be unavailable either asa 
cause of action or ground of defense." (underlinig ours.I 
CROMPTON v. JENSON et al., I P. 2d. 242, 78 Utah 55 
2. Payments on mortgage by mortgagor's authorizei 
agent, who subsequently pu1·chased property, preclud~ 
mortgagor or purchaser from claiming mortgage wai 
barred by limitations (Comp. Laws 1917, Secs. 6445, 
6466). 
BAKER v. BROUGHTON et al., 146 P. 2d, 832, 193 Okl 
656. 
5. A payment of interest on mortgage debt by mort· 
gagor after his conveyance of mortgaged realty to an· 
other, but before bar of statute of limitations has~~ 
come complete, tolls statute as against grai:tee takmi 
with notice of, but not assuming and agreeing to pay, 
mortgage. 
BROWN v. DECK, 152 P. 2cl. 587, 65 Idaho 710. 
1. Where two payments were made on note secure-0 
by mortgage, last of which was made before statute. 01 
limitations had run against the de~t, t~e cause of act1o~ 
was not barred by statute of lm11tat10ns regardl~ss 0 
whether the payments ,,·ere made on principal or mter· 
est. Code 1932, Sec. 5-238. 
MERCER v. MERCER, 180 P. '.2d, 248, 120 Mt. 132. . e 
1. A payment of principal and intf'rest extends t;m1 
for commencement of action on note from date of as 
12 
payment. Rev. Codes 1935, Secs. 9029, 9062. 
The proofs showed that both defendants were out-
side of the State of Utah from January 2, 1962, to the 
last of April, 1962. See last paragraph of Statement of 
Facts. The court found, paragrah 9 of Findings of Facts 
that both defendants were out of the State of Utah from 
January 2, 1962, to April 1, 1962. While this period was 
less than the proofs showed, this period tolled the run-
ning of the six-year statute of limitations on plaintiff's 
claim long enough to make plaintiff's action filed within 
the six-year limitation period. 
For authorities in support of the rule that absence 
from the state after a cause of action accrues tolls the 
running of the statute of limitations during such per-
iod, plaintiff submits the following: 
78-12-35 U.C.A. 1953 
Effect of absence from state. -- If when a cause of 
action accrues against a person when he is out of the 
state, the action may be commenced within the term 
herein limited after his return to the state; and if after 
a cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the 
time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the action. (underlining ours.) 
KEITH-O'BRIEN v. SNYDER, 169 Pac., 954, 51 Utah 227, 
1. 954 Compiled Laws 1907, Section 2888, pm-vid-
tng that if, when the cause of action accrues against 
a gerson, he is out of the state, the action may be 
commenced within the term limited after his return 
to the state, and if, after the cause of action accrues, he 
departs from the state, the time of his absence is not 
part of the time limited for the commencement of the 
action, applies though the debtor has a place of abode 
or residence within the state so that process might have 
been served not withstanding his absence . 
. 3. Under Comp. Laws 1907, Sec. 288.8, the stat~te of 
lm1tations runs only while the debtor is openly m ~e 
state, and immediately on his leaving it, the s~atute ag~m 
ceases to run until his return, and in computmg the time 
of absence all the periods of absence must be consdered 
and added together. 
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BUELL v. DUCHESNE MERCANTILE CO., 231 Pac. 123 
64 Utah 391. 1 
2. Debtor's absence from state tolls the statute of 
limitations (Comp. Laws 1917, Sec. 6465), notwithstand. 
ing he maintains residence in state \Vith persons residing 
there upon whom service of process might be made. 
SEELY v. COWLEY, 365 P. 2d, 63,12 Utah 2d 252. 
3. Statute to effect that if, after cause of action ac. 
crues against person he departs from state, time of his 
absence is not part of time limited for commencement 
of action, applies to personal representative of estate who 
absents himself from state. U.C.A. 1953, 78-12-28(2), 78· 
12-35. 
Therefore, the six-year statute of limitations started 
running over again on September 3, 1961, and it run from 
that date until January 2, 1962, a period of four months; 
then the running of the statute was tolled from January 
2, 1962, to April 1, 1962, and it began running again and 
run from April 1, 1962, to October 11, 1967, a period of 
five years six-months and eleven days. The total of said 
two periods during which the six-year statute run to 
the date on which this action was filed on October 11, 
1967, was five years ten months and eleven days, and 
hence before the six-year statute had run. 
POINT 3: Plaintiff-respondent's claim for the prin· 
cipal balance of $1065.00 due him for the land leveling 
he did for the defendants, plus the interest thereon al 
the legal rate of 6% per annum, from the due date to the 
date of judgment, is a just claim, and the law does not 
look with favor upon defeating a just cla~m if it can be 
properly avoided. 
It is apparent from the transcript of the evidence in 
this case that the plaintiff-respondent has never been 
paid the principal balance of $1065.00 which became due 
to him for the land leveling he did for the defendants. 
and he is justly entitled to be paid such balance togeth· 
er with legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 
its due date to the date of judgment, plus his costs here· 
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in expended, and if a defeat of such just claim can be 
properly avoided this should be done. Also where there 
is doubt as to whether a just claim is founded upon an 
instrument in writing, or upon an open account, an oral 
agreement, or is one created by statute, the one giving 
the longest period of limitation should be preferred. 
Plaintiff-respondent submits the following authorities 
supporting these rules: 
HARDINGE CO., Inc. v. EIMCO CORP., 266 P. 2d, 494; 1 
Utah 2d 320. 
4. Limitation of Actions Key 5 (3) Where substatiai 
doubt exists as to which is applicable statute of limita-
tions, the longer rather than the shorter period of limit-
ation is to be preferred generally. U.C.A. 1953, 78-12-23, 
25, 26(3). 
JUAB COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE 
v. SUMMERS, 456 P. 2d, 1, 19 Utah 2d 49. 
2. Limitation of Actions Key 5 (1) Generally, if there 
is doubt as to whether transaction is one under written 
contract or one created by state statute, one giving long-
est period of limitation is to be preferred. U.C.A. 1953, 
78-12-23, 78-12-26 ( 4). 
3. Action Key 12 The law does not look with favor 
upon defeating of just obligation if it can be properly 
avoided. 
Note: The trial judge, Hon. J. Harlan Burns, doubtless 
believed from the evidence submitted that the 
plaintiff's claim was a just claim when he cited 
this case in his Memorandum Decision about the 
middle of page 3 thereof. 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY v. SECURITY FIRST NAT. 
BANK OF LOS ANGELES, 191 P. 2d, 78, 84 CA 575. 
13. limitation of Actions Key 5 (1) Where facts relied 
upon leave it clearly in doubt whether case is within 
statute of limitations pleaded, court should not indulge 
a strained construction in order to support the plea. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff-respondent's claim is founded upon an in-
strument or instruments in writing, and hence !t is con-
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trolled by the six-year statute of limitation, whch had 
not run when the plaintiff's Complaint was filed and 
hence it is not barred by Section 78-12-23 U.C.A. 1953. 
Plaintiff's claim is not barred by Utah's four-year 
statute of limitations as this statute is not applicable 
Plaintiff's claim for the principal balance of $1065.00 plus 
interest thereon at 6% per annum from its due d~te to 
the date of judgment, plus plaintiff's costs, is a just 
claim, and the Honorable District Judge who made and 
caused to be entered herein judgment for said amounts 




Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
172 North Main Street 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
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